By Prof. Nassir Hussein Kahin, International Affairs Writer, Geopolitics Analyst and Managing Editor at Horn of Africa Strategic Review.
In a world increasingly defined by strategic chokepoints and proxy conflicts, the question of Somaliland’s recognition is no longer a matter of diplomatic caution—it is a test of geopolitical clarity.
The recent call by U.S. Republican Congressman of Tennessee for the recognition of Somaliland, following the precedent set by Israel, comes at a decisive moment. The entry of the Houthi Movement into a widening Middle Eastern war—paired with threats to shut down the Bab -el- Mandab Strait transformed the Red Sea into one of the most dangerous corridors in global trade.
This is no longer a regional issue. It is a global one.
Nearly 12 percent of the world’s seaborne oil and a significant share of global commerce pass through the Bab el-Mandeb, linking the Suez Canal to the Indian Ocean. If this artery is severed, the consequences will ripple across Europe, Asia, and beyond—fueling inflation, disrupting supply chains, and destabilizing markets.
Yet directly across from this volatile chokepoint lies Somaliland: a functioning democracy, a stable partner, and an unrecognized state.
For over three decades, Somaliland has maintained peace, conducted elections, and built institutions in stark contrast to the instability of southern Somalia. It has done so without international recognition, without access to global financial systems, and without the security guarantees afforded to recognized states.
This is precisely why recognition now matters.
For Israel, Somaliland represents a forward line of defense against Iranian expansion via Yemen. Its recognition aligns naturally with the logic of the Abraham Accords -expanding a network of pragmatic, security-oriented partnerships.
For the United States and its allies, the stakes are even higher.
Iran is no longer confined to the Persian Gulf. Through its proxies, it now threatens both the Straits of Hormuz and the Bab el-Mandeb—effectively positioning itself to choke global trade from two directions.
At the same time, China’s expanding footprint in Djibouti underscores a parallel strategic competition. With its only overseas military base located just miles from Somaliland’s coast, Beijing has already recognized the importance of this geography.
Unfortunately, the West so far has not.
Recognition of Somaliland would immediately unlock a series of strategic advantages: a reliable partner for maritime security, a potential host for military and intelligence infrastructure, and a democratic counterweight in a region increasingly shaped by authoritarian influence.
It would also send a powerful message—that democratic resilience, even in the absence of recognition, is not ignored but rewarded.
The argument against recognition has long rested on fears of setting precedents. But Somaliland is not a typical secessionist case. It is a former sovereign entity that voluntarily united with Somalia and later withdrew following state collapse and mass atrocities. Its case aligns closely with the principle of remedial secession under international law.
The greater risk now lies not in recognition, but in continued hesitation.
As the Red Sea becomes a theater of confrontation, the absence of Somaliland from the international system is no longer sustainable. It is a strategic blind spot.
Recognition is not merely an act of diplomacy. It is an act of necessity.
